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Abstract 
  
Ransomware is a significant global threat, with easy deployment due to the prevalent 
ransomware-as-a-service model. Machine learning algorithms incorporating the use of 
opcode characteristics and Support Vector Machine have been demonstrated to be a 
successful method for general malware detection. This research focuses on crypto-
ransomware and uses static analysis of malicious and benign Portable Executable files to 
extract 443 opcodes across all samples, representing them as density histograms within the 
dataset. Using the SMO classifier and PUK kernel in the WEKA machine learning toolset it 
demonstrates that this methodology can achieve 100% precision when differentiating 
between ransomware and goodware, and 96.5% when differentiating between 5 crypto-
ransomware families and goodware. Moreover, 8 different attribute selection methods are 
evaluated to achieve significant feature reduction. Using the CorrelationAttributeEval method 
close to 100% precision can be maintained with a feature reduction of 59.5%. The CFSSubset 
filter achieves the highest feature reduction of 97.7% however with a slightly lower precision 
at 94.2%. 
 
Using a ranking method applied across the attribute selection evaluators, the opcodes with the 
highest predictive importance have been identified as FDIVP, AND, SETLE, XCHG, 
SETNBE, SETNLE, JB, FILD, JLE, POP, CALL, FSUB, FMUL, MUL, SETBE, FISTP, 
FSUBRP, INC, FIDIV, FSTSW, JA.  The MOV and PUSH Opcodes, represented in the 
dataset with significantly higher density, do not actually have high predictive importance, 
whereas some rarer opcodes such as SETBE and FIDIV do.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In their December 2016 quarterly threat report [1] McAfee referred to 2016 as the “year of 
ransomware; the FBI estimated that $1Billion of ransom demands were paid in 2016 
representing a 400% increase from the previous year, and the cost of the average ransom 
demand doubled [2]. The  rise of the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model provided 
cybercriminals with the ability to distribute ransomware with very little technical knowledge 
[3] in addition to the potential for huge financial returns for both the distributors, and the 
developers within the model. (In July 2016 Cerber generated US $195,000 revenue for its 
distributors with a 40% cut of that figure going to the developer) [4]. 
 
Europol, in 2016, reported that ransomware had become the primary concern for European 
law enforcement agencies with Cryptoware the most prominent malware threat [5]. Again, in 
2017, they concluded that ransomware continued to be “one of the most prominent malware 
threats in terms of the variety and range of its victims and the damage done” [6].  In the 
recently commissioned 2017 Ransomware Report, 88% of survey respondents who has been 
affected by ransomware in the previous year had encountered crypto-ransomware [7].  
 
In 2017 ransomware achieved global news coverage due to the WannaCry [8] and subsequent 
Petya [9] outbreaks. Due to the nature of the WannaCry outbreak many high profile global 
organisations such as the UK National Health Service, Spanish telecommunications company 
Telefónica, and logistics company Fed-Ex. were subject to severe disruption [6]. The scale of 
the infection and subsequent media coverage provoked discussion and reaction down from 
government level through to security vendors, enterprises and domestic audiences. 
 
Current AV vendors that rely on static detection methods are struggling to contain the threat 
of ransomware due to the daily deployment of new variants, iterations and families. Recent 
new commercial software products have adopted heuristic detection methods for cyber 
defence purposes. For example Cybereason use behavioural techniques to protect consumer 
networks [10]; Darktrace employ advanced unsupervised machine learning for the protection 
of  enterprise networks [11]; MWR have developed RansomFlare “as an effective 
countermeasure to the increasing threat of ransomware” [12]. Although malware threats and 
detection techniques are predominantly targeted towards Microsoft Windows systems, 
machine learning techniques are also applied to other platforms such as OS X [13], Android 
[14] and IOT (Internet of Things) [15]. 
 
Due to its recent significance and effect on the cyber threat landscape [16] this paper focuses 
on crypto-ransomware affecting Microsoft Windows systems only. It will use static opcode 
density analysis of crypto-ransomware and benign samples using Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) supervised machine learning techniques. It aims to achieve >95% precision when 
differentiating between ransomware and goodware, and when differentiating between 5 
crypto-ransomware families and goodware. Moreover, 8 different attribute selection methods 
are evaluated to achieve feature reduction. This research will provide scope for further 
development, and practical or commercial application.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews related works on the topic of 
machine learning, ransomware and malware detection; Section 3 describes the research 
methodology and the 4 phases that it comprises; Section 4 presents the results of the 
experiment; Section 5 presents the conclusion and discusses future works. 
2. Related works and research literature 
 
[17] demonstrated that the use of machine learning techniques could detect malware 
effectively and efficiently. They used dynamic analysis reports obtained from an online 
analysis service, Anubis, to evaluate different machine learning classifiers, with the best 
performing J48 Decision Tree classifier achieving precision of 97.3%, and a false positive 
rate (FPR) of 2.4%. In 2011 [18] proposed a framework for the automatic analysis of 
malware behaviour using machine learning. They embedded the observed behaviour in a 
vector space and applied clustering algorithms to achieve significant improvement over 
previous work in that area. [19] presented a comprehensive overview of the state-of-the-art 
analysis techniques and tools for use by a malware analyst. They concluded that both static 
and dynamic analysis tools were required to overcome the evasion techniques that malware 
authors were using. The following year, after a detailed analysis conducted on the current 
malware detection systems that included static, dynamic and hybrid malware techniques, [20] 
concluded that data mining and machine learning was also required to compliment the 
limitations of existing techniques to achieve better detection. [21]  introduced a classification 
method that integrated static and dynamic to overcome the limitations associated with each 
technique. They demonstrated the importance of including both old and new malware 
samples to overcome the evasion techniques employed by malware authors. They achieved a 
minimum of 5% lower accuracy across all evaluated classifiers when using newer samples 
only. Similarly, in 2016 another comprehensive review was undertaken of techniques and 
tools for malware analysis and classification by [22]; it included processes for collection, 
static/dynamic analysis, feature extraction and machine learning classification. 
 
Bilar [23] used static analysis techniques to statistically compare the distribution of opcodes 
within malware and goodware. He concluded that the more infrequent opcodes were a better 
indicator of malware compared to the more frequent opcodes. This statistical research has 
been cited frequently and is one of most important works relating to opcodes and their ability 
to be used for malware prediction. Bilar (2007) then extended his research to analyse opcode 
control flows which is now a widely used technique for malware detection. [25] presented a 
control flow-based method to extract opcode behaviour from executable files to improve on 
text-based extraction methods and obtain a more accurate representation of the executable file 
behaviour.  The control flow method achieved a 2.3% improvement in accuracy over text-
based methods using a KNN classification. [26] used a similar technique with additional 
feature filtering to achieve a 97% accuracy with a Random Forest classifier. 
[27] proposed a malware classification system using approximate matching of control 
flowgraphs and a distance metric based on the distance between feature vectors of string-
based signatures to achieve high accuracy. 
 
Opcode density analysis has been extensively researched and applied to general malware 
detection. [28] used opcode density histograms to differentiate between malicious and benign 
PE files with 100% accuracy based on a 100 sample dataset (80 malicious /20 benign). [29] 
used dynamic analysis techniques to extract the opcodes from runtime traces and introduced 
SVM classifier filter techniques to perform dimension reduction. 
 
Further dimension reduction/feature filtering research has included [30] who proposed a two-
stage dimensionality reduction approach combining feature selection and extraction to 
substantially reduce the dimensionality of features for training and classification. 
 
[31] used static analysis techniques for opcode n-grams and compared several feature 
selection methods and machine learning classifiers. They concluded that Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) feature selection and Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
classification achieved the highest classification accuracy using a minimum number of 
features. [32] used feature reduction to identify the top-10 opcodes for malware detection and 
decreased the training time of a supervised learning algorithm by 91% with no loss of 
accuracy. [33] used feature reduction to identify 9 features that could distinguish malware 
from goodware achieving an accuracy of 99.60% using a Random Forest classifier. 
 
There are several techniques that have been researched for the detection of ransomware as a 
specific family. EldeRan [34], was a ransomware classifier based on a sample’s dynamic 
features; it achieved a True Positive Rate (TPR) of 96.3% with a low False Positive Rate 
(FPR) of 1.6%. UNVEIL [35] is another machine learning based system that uses a 
ransomware sample interacting with the underlying O.S. to achieve a True Positive Rate 
(TPR) of 96.3% and a zero False Positive Rate (FPR). Network related behaviour and 
Netflow data can also be used for ransomware detection as demonstrated by [36] and [37] in 
which they extracted conversation-based network traffic features to achieve a precision of 
97.3% using the Decision Tree (J48) classifier. In 2016  [38] introduced 2entFox, a 
framework for ransomware detection based on 20 extracted filesystem and registry events. 
Using a Bayesian network model, it achieved an F-measure of 93.3%. Most recently in 2017, 
[39] used sequential pattern mining of filesystem, registry and DLL events to achieve 99% 
accuracy when differentiating between crypto-ransomware and goodware, and 96.5% when 
differentiating between the 3 different ransomware families. Using a novel approach to detect 
crypto-ransomware in IOT networks based on power consumption, [40] achieved a detection 
rate of 95.65%, and a precision of 89.19% when monitoring connected Android devices. 
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
The methodology can be divided into 4 key stages as summarised in Fig.1:  
 
 
 
      
Fig. 1 The 4 key stages of the research 
 
 
 
3.1 Data Collection  
 
The ransomware families used for the experiment were identified from the Ransomware 
Tracker website [41], an online ransomware resource used by internet service providers 
(ISPs), computer emergency response teams (CERTs) and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). 
By studying the current tracked ransomware families focus was given to 5 crypto families 
only (Cerber, CryptoWall, Locky, TeslaCrypt, TorrentLocker) with the inclusion of historic 
samples where available to ensure that variant history and changes to the malicious code were 
included [21]. The Ransomware tracker website lists known Distribution, Payment and 
Command & Control hosts associated with each ransomware family; corresponding SHA256 
sample references are documented.  The SHA256 value for each identified sample was 
submitted to the Virus Total Intelligence platform [42] to facilitate quick, bulk downloading. 
The download list was reviewed to ensure that only the PE file format (Portable Executable) 
was downloaded, and other formats such as DLL (dynamic link library) were omitted. This 
was done to enable an accurate comparison with the goodware samples which were a similar 
PE format. 
 
The benign (Goodware) executable samples for the dataset were obtained from the Portable 
Apps platform [43], a portable software solution that allows popular software to be installed 
and run from portable storage devices. The Portable Apps platform provides suitable 
counterpart samples in that the executable files are portable (or standalone),  and ensure 
relevance across multiple OS versions [44]. Using a ‘certutil’ command run against the 350 
benign samples an output file was generated containing the SHA256 values for each sample. 
The SHA256 values were submitted in bulk to the VTI platform to determine the detection 
ratio for further analysis. Many of the samples were detected as infected by smaller antivirus 
vendors but the vendors that offered the highest protection e.g. BitDefender, F-Secure, 
Kaspersky , McAfee, Symantec, Trend Micro C [45] identified each of the goodware samples 
as clean, therefore the detection from the smaller vendors were deemed to be false positives, 
and discounted. Where a detection ratio of 4/total or higher was registered (regardless of 
vendor size) the samples were discarded.  
 
 
3.2 Feature extraction  
 
As the study focuses on the actual CPU instruction (opcode) and not the data that is to be 
processed (operand) the operand value has not been captured during the feature extraction 
process. Static analysis was performed using IDAPro with an InstructionCounter plugin to 
automate the opcode count process and export the results to text file format [46]. The 
InstructionCounter plugin was successfully installed and run correctly within a reduced-
functionality, evaluation version of the latest IDAPro version 6.95 [47]; it was tested 
successfully in both a Windows 7 Professional SP1 and Windows 10 Home environments. 
On loading the sample into IDAPro the plugin was run and the output captured to a text file 
that was saved with a name corresponding to the SHA256 hash file for easy recognition. This 
process was repeated for all samples, both malicious and benign. Due to the limitations with 
the evaluation version of the latest IDAPro 6.95, only 32-bit PE files could be loaded – 64-bit 
benign samples files were discarded and not analysed. 
Fig. 2 shows a sample feature extract using the InstructionCounter plugin. 
The columns in the output file represent rank, count, density and, opcode. The total number 
of opcodes is also included which provide useful for reference and to enable recalculation of 
the density with more numerical precision within the dataset (see section 3.3.2). 
 
 
Fig. 2 Sample InstructionCounter output file with top 10 opcodes, count and density 
 
3.3 Dataset creation  
 
Each executable sample is represented in the dataset as a density histogram to reflect the 
percentage density of each opcode occurrence relative to the total number of opcode 
occurrences. This process removes any variance that is attributed to different application and 
code lengths. Consider the 2 samples in Table 1 which relate to the MOV opcode. The 
malicious and benign samples have a large variation in both the total number of opcodes, and 
extracted number of MOV opcodes.  In both samples, however, MOV has a similar density 
and therefore are both equally ranked because of this. 
 
Table 1 
Example of MOV Opcode density 
Sample 
MOV Opcode 
Rank 
Total no. Density Total opcodes in sample 
Malicious (Cerber) 1 2,368 33% 7,215 
Benign 1 398,332 33% 1,192,874 
 
 
3.3.1 Merging the data 
 
A copy of all the malicious and benign output text files were placed in a single directory and 
merged into a single text file. The text file was opened in Microsoft Excel and using the ‘Text 
to Columns’ / ‘Sort A to Z’ / ‘Remove Duplicates’ features a master list of all the extracted 
opcodes (443) was obtained. This list was used to subsequently ensure that all records and 
features could be sorted alphabetically and therefore be correctly ordered. 
Using a custom recorded VB Macro each output file was combined with the master opcode 
list, sorted, transposed and inserted into a master Microsoft Excel worksheet to create a raw 
representation of the data. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Normalising the data 
Additional processing in Excel was required to finalise the created dataset.  
 
1. Each column was checked for correct alignment and sorting, samples were sorted by 
opcode count, records analysed and removed if containing duplicate data. 
The cell values were recalculated to increase the decimal place value to 8 as the 
InstructionCounter plugin had only exported to 2 decimal places. The increase in numerical 
precision was required as 8 decimal places provided a differentiation between no occurrence 
(i.e. 0 count) and low occurrence (e.g. 5), which in samples of high opcode count were both 
represented by 0.00.  
 
2. An additional “class” column was added where ‘good’ represented goodware and 
‘malware’ represented malware to provide a response/detection for the machine learning 
prediction. 
 
3. The dataset values were linearly scaled (0, 1). This was done for two reasons: to avoid 
attributes in greater numeric ranges dominating those in smaller numeric ranges; to avoid 
large attribute value calculation errors associated with some kernel functions.  [48] 
 
4. The final step was to calculate average density for each attribute and sort high to low. Fig. 
3 shows an example of the final sorted dataset with the attributes highlighted. (The ‘class’ 
attribute is usually listed at the end of the dataset and is referenced in WEKA using the 
‘last’ parameter. It is not shown in this example) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Dataset sample 
 
3.3.3 OpCode breakdown 
 
Almost 71 million opcodes were extracted from the benign samples with an average of 
308,038 codes per sample. This is in contrast to almost 3.5 million codes extracted from the 
malicious samples, with an average of 13,147 codes per sample. (Table 2) 
Fig. 4 also illustrates the opcode distribution for both classes with the malware samples 
predominantly using < 50 different opcodes, in comparison to goodware using between 100-
200.  It can be clearly seen that the structure for the malware samples is much simpler than 
the goodware samples with a lower overall count for both the number of extracted codes, and 
number of different opcodes used to perform the instructions. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Extracted opcode statistics 
Class Total extracted opcodes Average no extracted opcodes per sample Largest no codes 
Goodware    70,848,904     308,039  320 
Malware       3,418,229        13,147  163 
   
433 Total 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 OpCode distribution 
 
The average density for the top 20 opcodes in each class is illustrated in Fig. 5.  
It shows that the MOV opcode has the highest density at over 30% for both malware and 
goodware, compared to the second highest opcode, PUSH with around 13%. The densities for 
both classes are quite similar, especially for MOV and PUSH.  Table 3 shows the top 20 
opcodes for each class. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 OpCode density 
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Table 3 
Top 20 Opcode densities (%) 
 
Goodware Malware  Goodware Malware 
Rank Opcode Density Opcode Density Rank Opcode Density Opcode Density 
1 MOV 31.9% MOV 32.9% 11 JNZ 2.5% TEST 2.9% 
2 PUSH 13.8% PUSH 13.2% 12 XOR 2.2% XOR 2.7% 
3 CALL 9.6% CALL 6.4% 13 RETN 2.0% JNZ 1.9% 
4 POP 4.9% ADD 4.5% 14 SUB 1.8% RETN 1.8% 
5 LEA 4.3% CMP 4.1% 15 INC 1.0% AND 1.6% 
6 CMP 4.2% SUB 4.0% 16 AND 0.8% OR 1.3% 
7 JZ 3.5% JZ 3.9% 17 MOVZX 0.7% SHL 1.0% 
8 JMP 3.4% LEA 3.4% 18 DEC 0.7% INC 0.8% 
9 ADD 3.2% JMP 3.3% 19 OR 0.6% SAR 0.7% 
10 TEST 3.2% POP 3.2% 20 JLE 0.3% MOVZX 0.6% 
 
 
3.4 Machine learning classification  
 
The final phase involves the training and testing of the SVM classifier in the Waikato 
Environment for Knowledge Analysis 3.8.1 (WEKA) machine learning toolset [49]. WEKA 
was selected as the best tool for this experiment as it incorporates several standard machine 
learning techniques for simple workflow, can output results into a text and statistical format 
and offers several attribute selection evaluators. 
 
3.4.1 SVM and kernel functions 
 
The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised machine learning technique, especially 
effective where binary classification is required; it is therefore an effective classifier for 
malware detection which often has two classes for prediction – malicious (malware) and 
benign (goodware). An SVM classifies data by constructing a  hyperplane to separate data 
points in one class from those in another class; the best hyperplane therefore should have the 
largest margin of separation between both classes [50].  Where linear separation is not 
possible SVM can use kernel functions to transform the data into a higher dimensional 
feature space e.g. using by a radial hypersphere to achieve separation [51]. The goal of an 
SVM is therefore to produce a classification model based on a training dataset which is then 
used to predict the target values of the test dataset. [48].  
 
Sequential Minimal Optimization, (or SMO), is an algorithm used to train Support Vector 
Machines, devised by John Platt in 1998. The SMO can handle large datasets and scales well 
due to the memory footprint growing linearly with the training set size.   
 
In WEKA, the SMO classifier was run with all the default options including the selection of a 
‘Logistic’ calibration method. 
 
The SMO algorithm in WEKA uses linear, polynomial and Gaussian kernel functions and 
each kernel choice (Poly, NormalisedPoly, PUK, RBF) was initially tested using default 
values before further tuning and optimisation was applied. 
 
3.4.2 Feature / attribute selection process 
 
The attribute selection / feature reduction process is performed to enable the classifier to use 
the lowest number of features while maintaining the highest level of precision. Feature 
reduction applied to very large datasets can significantly decrease the training time for 
algorithms and the computational overhead associated with the high number of attributes and 
instances. Accuracy can also be increased by filtering out the noisy attributes that could have 
a negative effect on classification.  
 
Attribute selection methods can be grouped into 2 categories: wrapper methods and filter 
methods. Wrapper methods can achieve better performance than filter methods due to their 
ability to be optimised, however they cannot always be used in datasets with a large number 
of attributes due to the evaluation process requiring a computational overhead and 
excessively long training times [52]. 
 
Within the WEKA toolset there are 9 attribute selection evaluators. The WrapperSubsetEval 
options is not used in this experiment as it was briefly tested and proved unresponsive for the 
reasons already discussed. The following attribute selection methods were evaluated: 
CfsSubsetEval, CorrelationAttributeEval, GainRatioAttributeEval, InfoGainAttribute 
, OneRAttributeEval, Principal Component Analysis, ReliefFAttributeEval 
, SymmetricalUncertAttributeEval.  
 
WEKA has several search methods used by the attribute selection evaluators to perform 
either feature reduction, or ranking; in this experiment 3 search methods are employed: 1) 
‘BestFirst’ uses greedy hill climbing (performing evaluation at each iteration) to search the 
attribute subspace; it can be configured to start with no attributes and search forwards, start 
with all attributes and search backwards, or search both directions from any point. It has a 
“backtracking” option which is used to terminate the search when the number of consecutive 
non-improving nodes is reached; 2) ‘GreedyStepwise’ performs a greedy search through the 
attribute subset space and can also be configured to start with no attributes and search 
forwards, all attributes and search backwards, or search both directions from any point. When 
the addition or removal of any remaining attributes results in a decrease in evaluation, the 
search will stop. It can be configured to generate a ranking by recording the order that the 
attributes are selected. Used in conjunction with the “numToSelect” option (specifies the 
number of attributes to retain and “threshold” option (threshold at which attributes are 
discarded) further feature reduction can be achieved; 3) ‘Ranker’ generates a ranking for each 
attribute based on their individual evaluations. Used in conjunction with the “numToSelect” 
option (specifies the number of attributes to retain and “threshold” option (threshold at which 
attributes are discarded) further feature reduction can be achieved. 
 
 
3.5 Implementation 
 
The experiment can be separated into 4 district phases: 
 
1) Pre-processing the dataset 
 
2) Creating the training and test datasets 
 
 
3) Training and testing the SVM classifier 
Training and testing the attribute selection evaluators 
 
4) Tuning the attribute selection evaluators to achieve further feature reduction 
 
These phases are illustrated in workflow diagram Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6 The 4 experiment phases 
. 
3.5.1 Pre-processing the dataset (1) 
 
The full dataset CSV file was loaded into the WEKA pre-processing tool to be prepared for 
the classifier tasks. 
 
Outliers and extreme values are identified and removed in a two-step process. 
In step 1 the ‘weka.filters.unsupervised.attribute.InterquartileRange’ filter was applied to the 
loaded dataset to identify outliers and extreme values based on the results of interquartile 
aggregation. 
 
In step 2 the corresponding ‘weka.filters.unsupervised.instance.RemoveWithValues’ filter 
should be applied to remove the ‘outlier’ and ‘ExtremeValue’ attributes labelled as ‘yes’, 
however in this instance this step was not applied due to the high number of outliers detected. 
It was decided to continue with the experiment to see if the classification produced 
satisfactory results as Interquartile aggregation may not be a suitable method for outlier 
detection for the type of data in this dataset. 
 
 
Finally the dataset was shuffled using the filter 
weka.filters.unsupervised.instance.Randomize -S 42 to prevent an unequal sample distribution 
across either training, or test dataset. 
 
3.5.2 Creating the training and test datasets (2) 
 
Following shuffling the dataset was split into a training dataset (70%) and test (evaluation) 
dataset (30%). The following WEKA filters were applied and after each application the new 
dataset was saved in the. ARFF (Attribute-Relation File Format) format - a format consisting 
of a separate header and data section developed for use specifically within the WEKA 
software: 
 
 weka.filters.unsupervised.instance.RemovePercentage -P 30.0 
 (to remove 30% from each class in the dataset) 
 
 weka.filters.unsupervised.instance.RemovePercentage -P 30.0 -V 
 (selection inverted to swap the 30% back into the dataset) 
 
The resulting training and test datasets contained 343 and 103 instances respectively. 
 
3.5.3 Training and testing the SVM classifier (3.1) 
 
The SVM classification experiment was conducted in multiple phases with each classification 
run using all available kernel and search methods.  
 
The 10 main phases of the classification experiments are summarised in Table 4. 
 
  
Table 4 
The 10 main phases of the classifications 
Experiment Options Kernel Selections Available Search methods 
1. SMO Classifier 
2* Classes 
(malware, goodware) 
1. Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
- 
2. SMO Classifier 
6* Classes 
(malware 1-5, goodware) 
1. Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
- 
3. CFSSubsetEval 
1. Attribute Selection 
   Training and evaluation 
2. Feature Reduction 
   Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
BestFirst  
GreedyStepwise  
4. CorrelationAttributeEval 
 
1. Attribute Selection 
   Training and evaluation 
2. Feature Reduction 
   Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
Ranker  
5. GainRatioAttributeEval 
1. Attribute Selection 
   Training and evaluation 
2. Feature Reduction 
   Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
Ranker  
6. InfoGainAttributeEval 
 
1. Attribute Selection 
   Training and evaluation 
2. Feature Reduction 
   Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
Ranker  
7. OneRAttributeEval 
 
 
1. Attribute Selection 
   Training and evaluation 
2. Feature Reduction 
   Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
Ranker  
8. PrincipalComponents 
      - correlation matrix 
      - covariance matrix 
1. Attribute Selection 
   Training and evaluation 
2. Feature Reduction 
   Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
Ranker  
9. ReliefAttributeEval 
 
 
1. Attribute Selection 
   Training and evaluation 
2. Feature Reduction 
   Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
Ranker  
10. SymmetricalUncertAttributeEval 
 
 
1. Attribute Selection 
   Training and evaluation 
2. Feature Reduction 
   Training and evaluation 
- Poly 
- NormalisedPoly 
- PUK 
- RBF 
Ranker  
 
 
In each of the classification experiments training was performed using 10-fold cross 
validation. Cross-validation is an important technique used to help prevent overfitting by 
allocating a portion of the training dataset for validation, validating using multiple rounds 
(the number of rounds is determined by the number of specified folds, in this case 10) and 
then averaging the prediction results. Using 10-folds has become a standard process for cross-
validation and following extensive testing it has been shown that around this number 
achieves the best estimate of error [53]. All SMO classifier options were set to their default 
values and the experiment repeated for each of the 4 available kernel functions (Poly, 
NormalisedPoly, PUK, RBF) 
 
The test dataset (containing 30%, 103 instances) was supplied to the classifier and each 
model re-evaluated against the same test set. The evaluation metrics are compared in the 
following result tables. The highest performing evaluated model is highlighted in green, the 
lowest in red. 
 
3.5.4 Training and testing the attribute selection evaluators (3.2) 
 
In Phases 3 - 10 the Attribute Selection evaluators were run using default options and a single 
parameter changed to discard attributes below a threshold value of 0; this was selected to 
achieve an initial feature reduction prior to further tuning.  
The dimensionality of the data was therefore reduced by the attribute selection evaluation 
process before being passed onto the selected classifier, in this case, SMO.  
Classifications were performed using all available search methods and kernels (using default, 
untuned settings) and the results presented. 
 
3.5.5 Evaluation metrics  
 
The performance of each classification model was evaluated using the 5 default WEKA 
metrics as summarised in Table 6 and compared in the later Experiments and Results section. 
Table 5 
Evaluation metrics [54] 
Metric Calculation Value 
True positive rate (TPR)  TP/(TP+FN)  Rate of true positives (instances correctly classified as a given class) 
False positive rate (FPR)  FP/(FP+TN) Rate of false positives (instances falsely classified as a given class) 
Precision TP/(TP+FP) 
Proportion of instances that are truly of a class divided by the total instances 
classified as that class 
Recall TPR 
Proportion of instances classified as a given class divided by the actual total 
in that class (equivalent to TP rate) 
F-measure   
 2 × (Recall × Precision)/ 
(Recall + Precision) 
A combined measure for precision and recall  
(Estimate of entire system performance) 
 
TP= True positive, FN=false negative, TN= true negative, FP=false positive 
 
3.5.6 Machine specifications 
 
Best practice within malware analysis and malicious executable handling is to use an isolated 
virtual environment that is detached from its host. This provides the ability to restore the 
environment to a clean, previous state, to recover from, or clean-up after infection [44], [55]. 
The feature extraction phase of the experiment was undertaken within an isolated virtual 
environment on a lab PC with the network cable disconnected to further isolate it from the 
network. The virtual environment used for data collection and feature extraction was 
VMWare Workstation due to the ease of configuration, deployment and familiarity as the 
environment was already configured on the host laptop with a number of suitable VMs 
already in use for such tasks.  Table 7 outlines the environment machine specifications for 
each stage of the experiment. 
 
Table 6 
Machine specifications for each stage of the experiment 
Phase Host Virtual environment Application 
1. Data 
Collection 
Viglen Genie Desktop PC: 
 
 Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 
 8GB RAM 
 Intel Core 2 Quad CPU 
Q8400@ 2.66GHz 
 
 - VMWorkstation 12 Pro 
 12.1.1 build 3770994 
 
 - Debian 4.9.6-3 Kali2 (2017-01-30) i686 
GNU/Linux 
3GB RAM 
4 processors 
 
 - NAT mode 
(used to share the hosts ip address) 
Mozilla Firefox ESR 
45.7.0 
2. Feature 
Extraction  
- VMWorkstation 12 Pro 
 12.1.1 build 3770994 
 
- Windows 7 Professional SP1 
1GB RAM 
1 Processor 
 
 - Host only mode 
( a private network shared with the host only) 
IDA 6.95.160926 (32-
bit) 
3. Dataset 
creation 
Lenovo IdeaPad 310 
 Windows 10 Home 
 8GB RAM 
 Intel Core i5 6200U @2.40GHz 
 
- Microsoft Excel 2016 
MSO (16.1.7726.1049) 
64 bit 
4. Machine 
Learning 
Classifier 
- WEKA.version 3.8.1 
Java(TM) SE Runtime 
Environment 
1.8.0_112-b15 
java.version 1.8.0_112 
 
 
 
4.  Experiments and Results 
 
4.1 SMO (2 classes) 
 
In Phase 1 the SMO classifier was trained and tested using the classifier default options to 
obtain a benchmark set of evaluation metrics for all extracted attributes in the detection 
model. (Table 8). The 2 classes used were ‘malware’ and ‘goodware’. 
 
Table 7 
SMO (2classes) evaluation metrics 
Model Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
1 Poly 1 Training (10-fold cross-validation) 90.7% 9.5% 90.7% 90.7% 90.7% 444 
1 Poly 1 Re-evaluation against test set 94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 444 
2 NormalisedPoly 2 Training (10-fold cross-validation) 89.8% 10.7% 90.0% 89.8% 89.8% 444 
2 NormalisedPoly 2 Re-evaluation against test set 94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 444 
3 PUK Training (10-fold cross-validation) 86.9% 14.0% 87.5% 86.9% 86.8% 444 
3 PUK Re-evaluation against test set 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 444 
4 RBF Training (10-fold cross-validation) 80.5% 20.2% 80.6% 80.5% 80.4% 444 
4 RBF Re-evaluation against test set 82.5% 17.4% 82.6% 82.5% 82.5% 444 
 
1 Exponent default value set to 1.0 to achieve linear kernel function 
2 Exponent default value set to 2.0 to achieve quadratic kernel function 
 
 
With all default options set the PUK kernel (Pearson VII function-based universal kernel) 
achieved the best results with 100% precision and a 0% False Positive rate (FPR). 
 
The linear and quadratic kernel functions achieved slightly less than the target 95% precision 
and the RBF Gaussian kernel function only achieving 82.6% precision. 
 
Determining the best kernel function for the dataset can often only be achieved by conducting 
multiple experiments across all available kernels and parameters, and comparing the chosen 
evaluation metrics therefore the Poly, NormalisedPoly and RBF kernels were further tuned to 
achieve higher precision comparable to the PUK kernel results: 
 
- Poly/NormalisedPoly: 
‘Complexity’ tested using values 0.1, 1.0, 10.0, 100.0; ‘exponent using’ 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 
 
- RBF kernel: 
‘Complexity’ tested using values 0.1, 1.0, 10.0, 100.0; ‘gamma’ using 0.01, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0  
 
Table 9 below summarises the parameter selections that provided the highest precision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
New parameter selections for tuning the SMO kernels 
Kernel 
Changed 
parameters 
Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
Poly 
E = 2 
C = 1 
Training (10-fold cross-
validation) 
90.4% 9.6% 90.4% 90.4% 90.4% 444 
Poly 
E = 2 
C = 1 
Re-evaluation against test set 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 444 
Poly 
E = 1 
C = 10 
Training (10-fold cross-
validation) 
90.4% 9.6% 90.4% 90.4% 90.4% 444 
Poly 
E = 1 
C = 10 
Re-evaluation against test set 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 444 
NormalisedPoly 
E = 2 
C = 100 
Training (10-fold cross-
validation) 
89.8% 10.5% 89.8% 89.8% 89.8% 444 
NormalisedPoly  
E = 2 
 C = 100 
Re-evaluation against test set 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 444 
NormalisedPoly  
E = 3 
C = 10 
Training (10-fold cross-
validation) 
91.5% 8.8% 91.6% 91.5% 91.5% 444 
NormalisedPoly  
E = 3 
C = 10 
Re-evaluation against test set 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 444 
RBF 
γ = 1 
C = 10 
Training (10-fold cross-
validation) 
84.5% 16.4% 85.1% 84.5% 84.4% 444 
RBF 
γ = 1 
C = 10 
Re-evaluation against test set 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 444 
 
C -- The complexity parameter. 
E -- The exponent value 
γ -- The Gamma value. 
 
 
Each kernel, when properly tuned, can achieve 100% precision when re-evaluated against the 
test dataset.  
 
 
4.2 SMO (6 classes) 
 
Phase 2 required a second version of the dataset to be created and labelled with 6 different 
classes to represent the benign instances and 5 different ransomware classes. (A single dataset 
with 2 class attributes could have been used but creating separate datasets reduced the 
complexity) The steps in 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 were repeated to pre-process the data and create the 
training and test datasets for use in the 6-class classification model. 
 
Table 9 
SMO (6classes) evaluation metrics 
Model Kernel 
 
Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
45 Poly 1  Training (10-fold cross-validation) 
70.8% 10.2% 70.0% 70.8% 69.8% 444 
45 Poly 1  Re-evaluation against test set 
87.4% 4.1% 86.7% 87.4% 86.7% 444 
46 NormalisedPoly 2  Training (10-fold cross-validation) 
69.4% 14.6% 66.9% 69.4% 66.0% 444 
46 NormalisedPoly 2 
 
Re-evaluation against test set 87.4% 6.7% 86.3% 87.4% 86.6% 444 
47 PUK 
 
Training (10-fold cross-validation) 62.7% 26.2% 60.9% 62.7% 56.0% 444 
47 PUK 
 
Re-evaluation against test set 97.1% 0.3% 96.5% 97.1% 96.7% 444 
48 RBF  Training (10-fold cross-validation) 
49.3% 43.9% 35.1% 49.3% 34.7% 444 
48 RBF  Re-evaluation against test set 51.5% 47.6% 46.4% 51.5% 36.8% 444 
 
1 Exponent default value set to 1.0 to achieve linear kernel function 
2 Exponent default value set to 2.0 to achieve quadratic kernel function 
 
The evaluation metrics for this phase of the experiment can be seen in Table 10. 
With all default options set the PUK kernel (Pearson VII function-based universal kernel) 
once again achieved the best results with 96.5% precision and 0.3% False Positive rate 
(FPR). Table 11 shows the detailed accuracy by each class in the classification. Three classes 
(Good, TeslaCrypt, Cryptowall) achieved 100% precision and although Cerber achieved a 
100% TPR, 2 Locky samples were incorrectly detected as Cerber resulting in a decrease in 
precision due to receiving false positives. The confusion matrix for this association can be 
seen in Table 12. Although all classes were represented in the training dataset, the test dataset 
did not contain any instances for the Torrentlocker class which highlights an issue in that this 
class was not represented correctly in the dataset. 
 
 
Table 10 
Detailed accuracy by class (SMO 6 classes) 
TPR FPR Precision Recall F-measure Class 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Good 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Torrentlocker 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Teslacrypt 
86.7% 1.1% 92.9% 86.7% 89.7% Locky 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Cryptowall 
100.0% 2.1% 75.0% 100.0% 85.7% Cerber 
97.1% 0.3% 96.5% 97.1% 96.6% Weighted avg. 
 
Table 11 
Confusion matrix with false positives highlighted in red (SMO 6 classes) 
a b c d e f      <-- classified as 
51 0 0 0 0 0   |   a = good 
0 0 0 1 0 0   |   b = Torrentlocker 
0 0 22 0 0 0   |   c = TeslaCrypt 
0 0 0 13 0 2   |   d = Locky 
0 0 0 0 8 0   |   e = CryptoWall 
0 0 0 0 0 6   |   f = Cerber 
 
 
4.3 Training and testing the attribute selection evaluators (3.2) 
 
In Phases 3 - 10 the Attribute Selection evaluators were run using default options and a single 
parameter changed to discard attributes below a threshold value of 0; this was selected to 
achieve an initial feature reduction prior to further tuning.  
The dimensionality of the data was therefore reduced by the attribute selection evaluation 
process before being passed onto the selected classifier, in this case, SMO.  
Classifications were performed using all available search methods and kernels (using default, 
untuned settings) and the results presented. 
 
4.3.1 CFSSubsetEval 
 
CfsSubsetEval is a Subset evaluator that is used conjunction with an appropriate search 
option to determine the smallest subset size that has the same consistency as the full 
attribute set [53]. It assesses the predictive ability of each individual attribute and the degree 
of redundancy among them; it prefers sets of attributes that are highly-correlated with the 
class, but have low intercorrelation with each other. The CfsSubsetEval evaluator determined 
that a subset of 21 attributes had a consistency equal to the full set of 444 attributes. 
The highest performing model using the PUK kernel achieved 94.2% precision using 21 
attributes. (Table 13) The ranked 21 attributes are: SETS, SETNBE, SETNLE, JB, FSUB, 
XCHG, POP, OR, FUCOMPP, JLE, CMOVS, ROR, FIDIV, SETBE, JA, LEA, FNINIT, 
CALL, AND, SETLE, FDIVP 
 
Table 12 
CfsSubsetEval evaluation metrics 
Model Search method Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
5 BestFirst  Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
87.2% 13.7% 87.7% 87.2% 87.1% 21 
5 BestFirst  Poly 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
87.4% 12.7% 87.7% 87.4% 87.3% 21 
6 GreedyStepwise Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
87.2% 13.6% 87.6% 87.2% 87.1% 21 
6 GreedyStepwise Poly 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
87.4% 12.7% 87.7% 87.4% 87.3% 21 
7 BestFirst  NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.1% 10.3% 90.2% 90.1% 90.1% 21 
7 BestFirst  NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
87.4% 12.6% 87.4% 87.4% 87.4% 21 
8 GreedyStepwise NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.1% 10.3% 90.1% 90.1% 90.1% 21 
8 GreedyStepwise NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
87.4% 12.6% 87.4% 87.4% 87.4% 21 
9 BestFirst  PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
92.1% 8.1% 92.2% 92.1% 92.1% 21 
9 BestFirst  PUK 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
93.2% 6.8% 93.2% 93.2% 93.2% 21 
10 GreedyStepwise PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
92.1% 8.1% 92.2% 92.1% 92.1% 21 
10 GreedyStepwise PUK 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.2% 94.2% 94.2% 21 
11 BestFirst  RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
54.2% 51.7% 75.4% 54.2% 39.3% 21 
11 BestFirst  RBF 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
51.5% 49.5% 75.3% 51.5% 36.0% 21 
12 GreedyStepwise RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
54.2% 51.7% 75.4% 54.2% 39.3% 21 
12 GreedyStepwise RBF 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
51.5% 49.5% 75.3% 51.5% 36.0% 21 
 
4.3.2 CorrelationAttributeEval 
 
CorrelationAttributeEval is another Correlation-based evaluator but it uses ranking to 
evaluate each attribute and does not apply filtering. This is used in conjunction with the 
“discard” and “threshold” options to achieve feature reduction. 
 
The CorrelationAttributeEval evaluator uses the ranker search method so only achieved a low 
initial feature reduction due to the zero-discard threshold setting. It achieved 100% precision 
with the PUK kernel and this model was selected for further tuning. (Table 14) 
 
Table 13 
CorrelationAttributeEval evaluation metrics 
Model 
Search 
method 
Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
13 Ranker Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.7% 9.5% 90.7% 90.7% 90.7% 432 
13 Ranker Poly 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 432 
14 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
89.8% 10.7% 90.0% 89.8% 89.8% 432 
14 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 432 
15 Ranker PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
86.9% 14.0% 87.5% 86.9% 86.8% 432 
15 Ranker PUK 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 432 
16 Ranker RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
80.2% 20.5% 80.3% 80.2% 80.1% 432 
16 Ranker RBF 
Re-evaluation against 
test set 
82.5% 17.4% 82.6% 82.5% 82.5% 432 
 
4.3.3 GainRatioAttributeEval 
 
The GainRatioAttributeEval evaluator measures the gain ratio with respect to the class to 
evaluate predictor importance of each attribute [54]. Using the zero-discard threshold a 
feature reduction from 444 to 252 attributes and 99% precision using the PUK kernel was 
achieved. (Table 15) 
 
Table 14 
GainRatioAttributeEval evaluation metrics 
Model 
Search 
method 
Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
17 Ranker Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
91.3% 8.9% 91.3% 91.3% 91.3% 252  
17 Ranker Poly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 252 
18 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
91.0% 9.3% 91.0% 91.0% 91.0% 252 
18 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
95.1% 4.9% 95.3% 95.1% 95.1% 252 
19 Ranker PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.4% 9.7% 90.4% 90.4% 90.4% 252 
19 Ranker PUK 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
99.0% 1.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 252 
20 Ranker RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
81.0% 19.5% 81.1% 81.0% 81.0% 252 
20 Ranker RBF 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
82.5% 17.4% 82.6% 82.5% 82.5% 252 
 
4.3.4 InfoGainAttributeEval 
 
The InfoGainAttribute evaluator measures the information gain with respect to the class to 
evaluate predictor importance of each attribute [54]. Using the zero-discard threshold the 
same results as the GainRatioAttributeEval evaluator were achieved i.e. feature reduction 
from 444 to 252 attributes and 99% precision using the PUK kernel. (Table 16) 
 
 
 
Table 15 
InfoGainAttribute evaluation metrics 
Model 
Search 
method 
Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
21 Ranker Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
91.3% 8.9% 91.3% 91.3% 91.3% 252 
21 Ranker Poly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 252 
22 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
91.0% 9.3% 91.0% 91.0% 91.0% 252 
22 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
95.1% 4.9% 95.3% 95.1% 95.1% 252 
23 Ranker PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.4% 9.7% 90.4% 90.4% 90.4% 252 
23 Ranker PUK 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
99.0% 1.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 252 
24 Ranker RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
81.0% 19.5% 81.1% 81.0% 81.0% 252 
24 Ranker RBF 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
82.5% 17.4% 82.6% 82.5% 82.5% 252 
4.3.5 OneRAttributeEval 
 
OneRAttributeEval evaluates the worth of an attribute by using the OneR classifier, a simple 
cheap classifier that can obtain high accuracy using of a set of rules that all test one particular 
attribute to determine the class of an instance and aims to find the attribute with the fewest 
prediction errors [56].  
Using the zero-discard threshold the evaluator initially performed only a single attribute 
feature reduction by removing the ‘class’ attribute, however it achieved 100% precision using 
the PUK kernel. (Table 17) 
 
 
Table 16 
OneRAttributeEval evaluation metrics 
Model 
Search 
method 
Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
25 Ranker Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.7% 9.5% 90.7% 90.7% 90.7% 443 
25 Ranker Poly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 443 
26 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
89.8% 10.7% 90.0% 89.8% 89.8% 443 
26 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 443 
27 Ranker PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
86.9% 14.0% 87.5% 86.9% 86.8% 443 
27 Ranker PUK 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 443 
28 Ranker RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
80.2% 20.5% 80.3% 80.2% 80.1% 443 
28 Ranker RBF 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
82.5% 17.4% 82.6% 82.5% 82.5% 443 
 
 
4.3.6 PrincipalComponents 
  
Principal Component Analysis is a widely-used dimension reduction technique. It is based on 
the principle of converting a large number of variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated 
variables; it can reduce training and testing times for SVM classifiers with little decrease in 
accuracy [57]. The new attributes are then ranked in order of their eigenvalues with a subset 
of attributes selected by choosing sufficient eigenvectors to account for a specified proportion 
of the variance, usually 95%. The attributes can then be transformed back to their original 
space but with a loss of ranking for predictor importance. 
 
The PCA evaluation was performed using both the covariance and correlation (to perform 
standardisation) matrices which gave very different results. 
 
When run with the default values the covariance matrix achieved significantly higher 
dimension reduction resulting in just 7 attributes, but at the expense of performance. The 
highest precision using the correlation matrix and PUK kernel achieved just under the target 
95% precision with a value of 94.4%, with a reduction in attributes to 87. (Table 18) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 
PCA evaluation metrics 
Model 
Search 
method 
Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
29 1 Ranker Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
85.4% 15.5% 85.9% 85.4% 85.3% 87 
29 1 Ranker Poly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
90.3% 9.8% 90.8% 90.3% 90.3% 87 
30 1 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
54.2% 51.6% 63.7% 54.2% 40.3% 87 
30 1 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
50.5% 50.5% 25.5% 50.5% 33.9% 87 
31 1 Ranker PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
87.2% 12.5% 87.4% 87.2% 87.2% 87 
31 1 Ranker PUK 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 87 
32 1 Ranker RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
53.1% 53.1% 28.2% 53.1% 36.8% 87 
32 1 Ranker RBF 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
50.5% 50.5% 25.5% 50.5% 33.9% 87 
33 2 Ranker Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
72.9% 29.6% 76.2% 72.9% 71.5% 7 
33 2 Ranker Poly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
71.8% 28.6% 78.5% 71.8% 70.0% 7 
34 2 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
54.2% 51.6% 63.7% 54.2% 40.3% 7 
34 2 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
50.5% 50.5% 25.5% 50.5% 33.9% 7 
35 2 Ranker PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
85.1% 14.3% 85.7% 85.1% 85.1% 7 
35 2 Ranker PUK 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
85.1% 14.3% 85.7% 85.1% 85.1% 7 
36 2 Ranker RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
53.1% 53.1% 28.2% 53.1% 36.8% 7 
36 2 Ranker RBF 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
50.5% 50.5% 25.5% 50.5% 33.9% 7 
 
1
 using the correlation matrix 
2 
using the covariance matrix 
 
 
4.3.7 RelieffAttributeEval 
 
ReliefFAttributeEval is instance-based, sampling instances randomly and checking 
neighbouring instances of the same and different classes. It can operate on both discrete and 
continuous class data. [53] 
 
The ReliefFAttributeEval, an instance-based evaluator achieved 99% precision using the 
PUK kernel, with a feature reduction to 281 features. (Table 19) 
 
Table 18 
ReliefFAttributeEval evaluation metrics 
Model 
Search 
method 
Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
37 Ranker Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
91.0% 9.2% 91.0% 91.0% 91.0% 281 
37 Ranker Poly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 281 
38 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.7% 9.8% 90.8% 90.7% 90.6% 281 
38 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
93.2% 6.9% 93.3% 93.2% 93.2% 281 
39 Ranker PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.4% 10.2% 90.6% 90.4% 90.3% 281 
39 Ranker PUK 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
99.0% 1.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 281 
40 Ranker RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
80.8% 19.8% 80.8% 80.8% 80.7% 281 
40 Ranker RBF 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
82.5% 17.4% 82.6% 82.5% 82.5% 281 
4.3.8 SymmetricalUncertAttributeEval 
 
SymmetricalUncertAttributeEval evaluates the worth of an attribute by measuring the 
symmetrical uncertainty with respect to the class, assigning a value of 0 or 1 to represent 
irrelevance and relevance respectively [54]. It achieved very high precision, 99% with a 
feature reduction to 252 features. (Table 20) 
 
Table 19 
SymmetricalUncertAttributeEval evaluation metrics 
Desc 
Search 
method 
Kernel Action TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Attributes 
41 Ranker Poly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
91.3% 8.9% 91.3% 91.3% 91.3% 252 
41 Ranker Poly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 252 
42 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
91.0% 9.3% 91.0% 91.0% 91.0% 252 
42 Ranker NormalisedPoly 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
95.1% 4.9% 95.3% 95.1% 95.1% 252 
43 Ranker PUK 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
90.4% 9.7% 90.4% 90.4% 90.4% 252 
43 Ranker PUK 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
99.0% 1.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 252 
44 Ranker RBF 
Training (10-fold 
cross-validation) 
81.0% 19.5% 81.1% 81.0% 81.0% 252 
44 Ranker RBF 
Re-evaluation 
against test set 
82.5% 17.4% 82.6% 82.5% 82.5% 252 
 
 
4.4 Tuning the attribute selection evaluators to achieve further feature reduction (4) 
 
The best performing model from each phase model was tuned by applying a decremental 
change to the discard threshold within the Ranker or greedy stepwise searches to achieve 
increased feature reduction, but without a decrease in precision. Once a decrease had been 
reached, the highest number of attributes required to maintain performance was recorded.  
In each of the classification experiments training was performed using 10-fold cross 
validation with each model re-evaluated against the same test set. Table 21 compares the final 
feature reduction achieved by each tuning process. The CorrelationAttributeEval still 
achieves 100% precision and 0% TPR with a significantly reduced no. of features (reduced to 
180). CFSSubset is the lowest performing evaluator with a 94.2% precision rate but it does 
provide the highest feature reduction at only 10 features or a 97.7% reduction. 
 
Table 20 
Comparison of feature reduction 
Model Desc Search method Kernel TPR FPR Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
Feature 
Reduction 
Reduction 
  
3 
SMO (Benchmark) - PUK 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
-  
10 CFSSubset GreedyStepwise PUK 94.2% 5.9% 94.2% 94.2% 94.2% 21 -> 10 97.7% 
15 CorrelationAttributeEval Ranker PUK 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 432 -> 180 59.5% 
19 GainRatioAttributeEval Ranker PUK 99.0% 1.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 252 -> 183 58.8% 
23 
InfoGainAttributeEval Ranker PUK 99.0% 1.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 
252 -> 128 71.2% 
27 
OneRAttributeEval Ranker PUK 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
443 -> 332 25.2% 
31 
PrincipalComponents Ranker PUK 94.2% 5.9% 94.4% 94.2% 94.2% 
87 -> 55 87.6% 
39 ReliefFAttributeEval Ranker PUK 99.0% 1.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 281 -> 77 82.7%% 
43 SymmetricalUncertAttributeEval Ranker PUK 99.0% 1.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 252 -> 133 70.0% 
 
4.5 Important Opcodes 
 
Table 5-16 shows a list of the top 21 ranked Opcodes by each attribute selection evaluator. 
The top 21 values have been chosen to reflect the value (21) of the initial feature reduction 
achieved by the CFSSubsetEval method for full comparison. Due to the difficulty in 
calculating the specific ranked Opcodes by the PCA filter the attributes have been 
transformed back into their original space resulting in an equal rank being assigned to each 
attribute. The PCA top21 Opcodes have included on Table 22 for reference but are not 
ranked. 
 
Table 21 
Top 21 ranked opcodes by feature reduction method 
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1 SETS JLE SETLE FDIVP FDIVP POP FDIVP SUBPS 
2 SETNBE CALL FDIVP XCHG AND INC SETLE MULPS 
3 SETNLE FILD SETBE AND XCHG JNZ FILD SETNBE 
4 JB POP SETNBE JA SETLE CMP FSUBRP PADDW 
5 FSUB JG FSUBRP INC SETNLE PUSH MUL CVTTSS2SI 
6 XCHG AND SETNB SETNLE JB CALL SETNBE FRNDINT 
7 POP FIDIV FILD SETLE FMUL ADD SETBE XORPD 
8 OR FMUL ROR MUL FSTSW DEC AND FDIVRP 
9 FUCOMPP JL CALL FMUL FADDP JL XCHG ADDPS 
10 JLE DEC FISTP STOS FSUB JLE FSUB FSUBRP 
11 CMOVS SUB FIDIV FSUB FISTP JNB FISTP FUCOM 
12 ROR OR FNINIT JB MUL AND JB PADDD 
13 FIDIV SETNBE FSTP JLE SHLD RETN FSTSW ORPD 
14 SETBE FDIV BSWAP RCR FXCH XOR SETNLE PMINUW 
15 JA FDIVRP FSTSW SETZ SCAS SUB JA COMISS 
16 LEA FISTP MUL NOT FDIV TEST STOS FIADD 
17 FNINIT FMULP FLD FSTSW FABS JZ FMUL PUNPCKLBW 
18 CALL CMC LODS FADDP FILD JB SETNB CMOVBE 
19 AND NEG FDIV JS FSUBRP STD JLE CMOVB 
20 SETLE IMUL CMOVS JNZ SETZ JNS FSTP FXAM 
21 FDIVP LDMXCSR FSUB SETNL FLDZ OR SETZ SUBPS 
 
1 PrincipalComponents listed are unranked. 
 
Highlighted in Table 5-16 are any occurrences of the common crypto functions used by 
ransomware: XOR, ROL, ROR, ROT. Although XOR, ROL, ROR have been selected by 4, 6 
and 8 attribute filters respectively as predictive features, only ROR appears more than once in 
the top 21 ranked predictors and does not feature in the top 20 overall ranked predictors. 
The CFSSubset Evaluator can provide feature reduction from 443 to 10 attributes but the 
ROR attribute can be discarded without any decrease in precision. 
 
To achieve an overall ranking for OpCode predictor importance the top 21 attributes selected 
by the first 7 evaluation methods in Table 5-17 have been assigned a weight from 21 -> 1, 
where 21 represents the highest rank, down to 1 for the lowest. The overall ranking is 
provided in Table 23. 
 
Table 22 
Overall ranking for opcode predictor importance 
Overall 
Ranking 
Opcode Description [58] 
Histogram  
density % 
Histogram density 
rank /443 
1 FDIVP Divide, store result and pop the register stack. 0.002 140 
2 AND Logical AND 1.201 15 
3 SETLE Set byte if less or equal 0.014 69 
4 XCHG Exchange Register/Memory with Register 0.038 54 
5 SETNBE Set byte if not below or equal 0.001 145 
6 SETNLE Set byte if not less or equal 0.058 45 
7 JB Jump short if below 0.243 28 
8 FILD Load Integer 0.035 56 
9 JLE Jump short if less or equal 0.244 27 
10 POP Pop a Value from the Stack 4.01 5 
11 CALL Call Procedure 7.881 3 
12 FSUB Subtract 0.025 62 
13 FMUL Multiply 0.055 46 
14 MUL Unsigned Multiply 0.024 63 
15 SETBE Set byte if below or equal 0.001 184 
16 FISTP Store Integer 0.008 88 
17 FSUBRP Reverse Subtract 0.002 138 
18 INC Increment by 1 0.857 17 
19 FIDIV  Divide 0.006 162 
20 FSTSW Store x87 FPU Status Word 0.008 86 
21 JA Jump short if above 0.133 36 
 
The 2 opcodes with the highest density, MOV (32.45%) and PUSH (13.49%) do not have 
good predictive importance due to their prevalence in both ransomware and benign samples. 
Table 4-16 illustrates that some of the more infrequent Opcodes such as SETBE and FIDIV 
are better indicators of ransomware. This partly agrees with Bilar’s conclusion that less 
frequent opcodes make better indicators of malware than the most frequent opcodes. [23] 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This research demonstrated that the analysis of CPU instructions (opcodes) can be used to 
differentiate between crypto-ransomware and goodware with high precision. 
As per the results presented in this chapter a high precision (>95%) rate has been achieved for 
the 2-class model using all 4 kernel options, the 6-class model with the PUK kernel, and 6 out 
of 8 feature reduction models (with the remaining 2 at 94.2%) 
 
It has also been demonstrated that the PUK kernel is the simplest kernel to use for the SMO 
classifier as it is flexible and self-optimising, achieving 100% precision with no tuning 
required. The linear, polynomial and Gaussian kernels can also achieve 100% precision when 
optimised. For all other models (6-class and feature reduction) the PUK kernel achieved the 
highest precision using the default settings. 
By employing the chosen methodology of static analysis, opcode extraction and density 
histogram representation, a Support Vector Machine can be trained to differentiate between 2 
classes (crypto-ransomware and goodware) with 100% precision when using all kernel 
selections, and between 6 classes (5 crypto-ransomware families and 1 goodware) with 
96.5% precision (96.7% accuracy) using the PUK kernel. Both levels of precision exceeded 
the 95% target set in the objectives. Moreover, when differentiating between ransomware and 
goodware, feature reduction from 443 extracted opcodes down to 180 opcodes can be 
achieved using the CorrelationAttributeEval filter with no loss of precision. Feature reduction 
from 443 to 10 opcodes can be achieved using the CFSSubsetEval filter, but with a lower 
precision of 94.2%. 
 
There is scope to extend and develop this research. The dataset can be extended to include 
other crypto-ransomware families such as WannaCry or similar advanced “ransomworms” 
[59] ; a reduced, optimum feature extraction process can be developed by extracting only the 
groups of opcodes identified by the attribute selection evaluators; dynamic runtime extraction 
of opcodes with time-based features can be applied to demonstrate real-time application as a 
crypto-ransomware threat detection method. 
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